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INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
This case is governed by the plain language of the lease renewal option. That
provision requires the option rent to be "at a market rate mutually agreed upon" by the
parties. (Addendum to Brief of Appellant, hereafter "Add.," at 29.) Little Caesar
concedes the absence of any agreement, but argues that the district court properly set the
rent at the maximum "Minimum Rent." However, "Minimum Rent" is only one
component of the total "market rate" for the option period. Because the parties never
agreed on the "market rate," the option is void and unenforceable.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE OPTION PROVISION DOES NOT SPECIFY A RENTAL
RATE WITH SUFFICIENT CERTAINTY AND DEFINITENESS TO
BE ENFORCED.

In its opening brief, Bell Canyon applied long-established Utah law to demonstrate
that the option provision is void and unenforceable because it left the rental rate to future
agreement of the parties, and the parties reached no agreement. (Br. of App. 7-15.) Little
Caesar does not dispute the law, but argues that the terms of the option are sufficiently
certain for enforcement without agreement of the parties. (Br. of Aplee. 8-16.) However,
that argument ignores the plain language of the option provision requiring agreement on a
"market rate."
A.

Language of Option Provision.
The rental terms of the option provision, quoted verbatim below, plainly require

mutual agreement on a "market rate" for the option period:

The Minimum Rent for the first option period shall be at a market rate
mutually agreed upon bv Tenant and Landlord. In the first option period,
the Minimum Rent shall not be higher than $ 11.00 per square foot. Rent in
the second option period shall also be at market rates. Market rates shall be
at the then prevailing market rates for similar space in similar shopping
centers within 5 miles of the Shopping Center. Landlord and Tenant shall
mutually agree on the market rate within 30 days of Tenant's notification to
Landlord that Tenant wishes to exercise an option period. [Add. 29, ^f 4,
emp. added.]
The term "market rate" in a commercial lease contemplates two separate components, one
for "Minimum Rent" based on square footage, and a second for percentage rent based on
sales. That explains the two separate, plural references to "market rates," one for
minimum rent and one for percentage rent. As a protection to the tenant, the first
component, "Minimum Rent," was set at a maximum of $11 per square foot for the first
option period. However, that figure plainly was not intended as the total option rent, or
the remaining references to future agreement on a "market rate," as well as the definition
of "market rates," would be rendered superfluous.
Little Caesar's entire argument is based on its strained interpretation of the term
"Minimum Rent" in the option provision. (Br. of Aplee. 8-9.) Little Caesar reasons that
because paragraph 3 of the Lease Addendum reduced "minimum rent" to $1,190 "for the
remainder of the existing Lease term." and the original Lease also set "Basic Monthly
Rent" at $1,190, the terms "minimum rent" and "Basic Monthly Rent" must mean the
same thing. However, even if accepted, that argument proves nothing because both terms
refer to the basic component of rent to which a percentage component may be added.
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(See Lease definitions: "Percentage Rent" is calculated separate from, and in addition to.
"Basic Monthly Rent.") Therefore, even if the term "Minimum Rent" in the option
provision referred to "Basic Monthly Rent," it would still allow for addition of a
percentage component to reach a mutually agreed "market rate" for the option period.
Moreover, as indicated, the language cited by Little Caesar in paragraph 3 of the
Lease Addendum refers to the rental rate during the existing Lease term, while paragraph
4 contains the rental provisions for the future option terms. While the original Lease
specifically provides for "zero" percentage rent during the initial term, the option
provision contains no such limitation, thus allowing for percentage rent in addition to
"Minimum Rent" during the option period.
Little Caesar cites Cummings v. Rytting, 207 P.2d 804 (Utah 1949), for the
proposition that nonapplication of percentage rent in the original Lease precluded any
percentage rent during the option period. (Br. of Aplee. 13.) However, that case, which
has never been cited by a court, stands for no such thing. Cummings dealt with an option
provision that said only, "With afiveyear option," with no mention of option terms and
no contemplation of any required future agreement or lease document. Id. at 805-06.
Accordingly, the court enforced the lease option on the same terms as the original lease.
Id. By contrast, in the present case, the option provision specifically requires the rental
rate for the option period to be renegotiated and set "at a market rate mutually agreed
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upon by" the parties. Therefore, the option rental rate is neither fixed nor limited by the
terms of the original lease.
Little Caesar quotes language from the option provision out of context to support
its faulty interpretation, as follows: "Monthly rent during the first option period 'shall be
at a market rate mutually agreed upon by Tenant and Landlord,' but 'shall not be higher
than $11.00 per square foot.'" (Br. of Aplee. 10.) Nowhere does the option provision
state that monthly rent for the option period shall not be higher than $11 per square foot.
Rather, it states that "the Minimum Rent shall not be higher than $11.00 per square foot."
(Emp. added.) The option provision expressly requires "mutual agreement" on two
separate "market rates": First, the "market rate" for the "Minimum Rent," for which the
option contains the $11-maximum; and second, the "market rate" for the total rent, which
was to be determined within 30 days after notice of exercise of the option. (Minimum
rent + percentage rent = total rent.) Accordingly, the $11-rate cited in the option is not
the maximum total rent for the option period, but the maximum "Minimum Rent," or base
rent, for the period. The parties, and the court, are bound by the actual language of the
option, not by Little Caesar's selective (and deceptive) misquotations of the language.
Little Caesar argues that a percentage rent component cannot apply during the
option term because the percentage rent provisions in the initial Lease were deleted. (Br.
of Aplee. 11-13.) However, the percentage rent section of the Lease (section 4.3) was
marked "deleted" during the initial term only because "Percentage Rent" was set at
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"zero" for the initial term. (See definition of "Percentage Rent," Lease p. 1.) Section 4.3
was not literally removed from the Lease, and the "Percentage Rent" definition, which
was not marked "deleted," also remained part of the Lease for possible application during
the renewal periods. "Zero" percentage rent is common during the initial term of a
commercial lease because the parties have no record of what actual sales will be. With a
record of sales established during the initial term, the parties can accurately set a
percentage rent for subsequent terms. Accordingly, the fact that percentage rent was not
applied during the initial term of the Lease does not preclude its application during the
renewal periods. Little Caesar refers to no language in either the Lease or the option
provision stating that rent during the option period will be the same as during the initial
period, or that nonapplication of percentage rent for the initial term would necessarily
carry over into the option period. Rather, the option rental is governed exclusively by the
option provision, which clearly states that "Minimum Rent" and total rent will be set at
"market rates" "mutually agreed upon" by the parties. Those "market rates" clearly
contemplate, or at least permit, an agreed component for percentage rent.
B.

Utah Case Law.
Little Caesar disputes the application of governing case law, which holds that a

lease renewal option is unenforceable in the absence of an agreed rental, or other terms to
fix the rental with "certainty and definiteness." Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah,
Inc., 558 P.2d 1317, 1321 (Utah 1976). Little Caesar attempts to distinguish Pingree on
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the basis that the tenant there refused to pay the $900 "maximum total monthly rental,"
id. at 1320, while Little Caesar here "has agreed to pay the maximum amount that Bell
Canyon could require," referring to the $11-maximum "Minimum Rent." (Br. of Aplee.
16.) However, as demonstrated above by the language of the option provision, the $11
rate is only the maximum "Minimum Rent," not the maximum total rent. Accordingly,
Pingree is exactly on point and controlling here. Because the parties failed to agree on
the "market rate" for total option rent, the option is void and unenforceable.
Little Caesar also attempts to distinguish Brown's Shoe Fit Co. v. Olch, 955 P.2d
357 (Utah App. 1998), which held a lease renewal option unenforceable because it
required future agreement of the parties on the percentage rent component of total rent,
and the parties never agreed. Id. at 362-64. Little Caesar asserts that the option in the
present case is sufficiently definite without agreement because it provides for "Minimum
R e n t . . . at a market rate . . . [that] shall not be higher than $ 11 per square foot." (Br. of
Aplee. 15.) However, again, Little Caesar is erroneously equating "Minimum Rent" with
total rent. The stated cap of $11 applies only to the "Minimum Rent," which, by
definition and common usage, allows for the additional component of percentage rent to
obtain total rent. Both "Minimum Rent" and total rent were to be set at "market rates"
"mutually agreed" to by the parties. In the absence of such agreement or more definite
terms, the option is "too vague and indefinite for specific performance." Brown's Shoe
Fit, supra, at 365.
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In summary, the plain language of the option requires mutual agreement on rental
at market rates. No agreement was reached, and the option contains no mechanism for a
court to impose a rental rate. Therefore, the option is unenforceable. Pingree and
Brown's Shoe Fit, supra; Richard Barton Enterprises, Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 373
(Utah 1996) (court cannot impose lease agreement when parties have "explicitly
disagreed as to the essential terms thereof).
POINT II:

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON THE WHITTLE
AFFIDAVIT TO INTERPRET THE UNAMBIGUOUS OPTION
PROVISION.

Little Caesar argues that the Whittle Affidavit was properly considered "to the
extent that Bell Canyon's arguments created any ambiguity" in the option provision. (Br.
of Aplee. 17.) In other words, Little Caesar concedes that the affidavit is admissible only
to resolve ambiguity. However, ambiguity cannot be "created" by the arguments of a
party; rather, ambiguity must be determined as a matter of law from the four corners of
the document. See, e.g., Interwest Constr. v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1359 (Utah 1996).
Here, Little Caesar has never argued that the option provision is ambiguous, and the
district court made no determination of ambiguity. Therefore, any consideration of the
Whittle Affidavit was improper. Moreover, Little Caesar's argument that consideration
of the affidavit is justified by ambiguity in the option provision amounts to a concession
that the option lacks the "certainty and definiteness" to be enforced. The option cannot be
both clear and ambiguous.
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Little Caesar cites In re General Determination of Rights, 1999 UT 39, 982 P.2d
65, for the proposition that the district court has "broad discretion" in the admission of
affidavits. (Br. of Aplee. 17.) However, that case did not deal with the parol evidence
rule, but with challenges based on general rules of evidence. The parol evidence rule is
not merely an exclusionary rule of evidence, but a substantive rule of law. E.g., Payne v.
Buechler, 628 P.2d 646, 649 (Mont. 1981); Lower Kuskokwim Sch. Dist. v. Alaska
Diversified Contr., 734 P.2d 62, 63 n.l (Alas. 1987); Gulotta v. Triano, 608 P.2d 81, 82
(Ariz. App. 1980). Therefore, the district court has no discretion to disregard the parol
evidence rule in making a legal interpretation of a written contract. See Interwest Constr.
v. Palmer, supra, at 1358-59 (question of ambiguity and legal interpretation are reviewed
for correctness); Dixon v. Pro Image Inc., 1999 UT 89,fflj13-14, 987 P.2d 48, 52.
Finally, Little Caesar argues that extrinsic evidence is admissible to determine
whether a contract is ambiguous, citing Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass 'n, 907 P.2d
264 (Utah 1995). In that case, Justice Durham proposed a new framework for contract
analysis that would significantly narrow the parol evidence rule by permitting
consideration of extrinsic evidence in determining whether ambiguity exists. Id. at 268.
Justices Russon and Zimmerman noted the clear departure from established law in their
dissenting opinions. Id. at 269 (Russon, J., dissenting); id. at 271 (Zimmerman, J.,
dissenting). However, in its very next parol evidence case, Interwest Constr. v. Palmer,
supra, the Supreme Court "clarified" and returned to its long-established parol evidence
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Alternatively, Ward is distinguishable on the grounds that the affidavit presented there did not
contradict the parties' written agreement. 907 P.2d at 269. By contrast, the Whittle Affidavit does
contradict the written option provision by asserting that the maximum total option rent was to be $11 j>er
square foot, with no application of percentage rent. fl[ 11.) Accordingly, the Whittle Affidavit is
inadmissible even under the proposed Ward standard.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the order of summary judgment
for Little Caesar and enter judgment for Bell Canyon on the grounds that the option
provision is void and unenforceable. In addition, the Court should reverse the award of
attorney fees to Little Caesar and award attorney fees for both trial and appeal to Bell
Canyon as the prevailing party under the attorney fee provision of the Lease.
Respectfully submitted this £f

day of June, 2000.
KIRTON & McCONKIE
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